The Choices of Being Governed: Citizen and Elite Preferences and Extension of State Power in the Drylands of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda

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Abstract
The drylands of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda, a long-neglected region that straddles the borders of the three countries, has in recent years experienced rapid and thoroughgoing extension of state presence. Such processes of incorporation of political peripheries into states have been important features of state-making and today are quickly eroding the previous autonomy of the world’s stateless societies. What are the preferences of the inhabitants of such peripheries concerning their incorporation into states? To what extent can these preferences be altered by government actions? In this paper, I present the results of a conjoint experiment conducted to answer these questions. I find that the inhabitants of the drylands have strong preferences for incorporation of local populations into states and of local leaders into state-based decision-making processes as well as for negotiating solutions to disagreeable government policies. The effects of policy changes on these preferences are limited. In contrast, drylanders’ preference for the identity of individuals responsible for implementation of important policies and projects is weaker and, relatedly, more malleable. These findings have important policy implications and contribute to both the state-making literature and for scholarship on preferences.

Introduction
Political peripheries, liminal areas on the edges of state authority, have been a common feature of state-making processes. In the (near-)absence of the state and its representatives (such as administrators and military and police personnel), the populations of such peripheries have commonly relied on alternative political arrangements—the ‘art of not being governed’ (by states,

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in any case), as James C. Scott has called them—in some cases long after those areas’ nominal incorporation into states. Peripheries are by no means an exclusively historical phenomenon. In Sub-Saharan Africa and elsewhere in the Global South, some states’ ability to project their authority throughout their territories, and especially peripheries, remains limited. A growing literature reports, however, ongoing state efforts to extend state power in previously neglected areas. Given the benefits of keeping the state at arm’s length, as well as local populations’ satisfaction with their own governance arrangements and their lack of familiarity with the state, such efforts may encounter local resistance. Subsequent conflict can be costly for both states and local populations. It can also preclude the realization of the objectives that led a government to initiate its attempt to extend state power and prevent the local population from accessing the public goods, such as public services or physical infrastructure, offered by the state. How can states develop policies and approaches to extension of state power that are welcomed by local populations and their leaders?

The answer to this question lies largely in the preferences of the inhabitants, including local leaders, of the peripheries over which governments seek to establish control. What are the preferences of local populations and their leaders concerning the key aspects of such meaningful (as opposed to nominal) incorporation into states? Can governments take actions that will alter those preferences? Despite the considerable scholarly interest in peripheries and extension of state power, the existing literature provides little—and no direct—evidence of the preferences of the affected populations. In this paper, I set out to overcome this limitation and examine such preferences through the lens of the ongoing process of extension of state power in the dryland region that straddles the borders of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda (Map 1).

The drylands occupied a marginal position within the three countries for a century after the region was divided by national borders drawn arbitrarily at the turn of the twentieth century. For the next century the Ethiopian, Kenyan, and Ugandan governments, both colonial and postcolonial, paid little attention to the dryland periphery, which they considered to be of little value. Since the turn of the twenty-first century, however, the governments of all three countries have embarked upon concerted efforts to extend their presence, and power, in the region. These efforts have

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3 Later in the paper, I make a distinction between such nominal, formal incorporation, which does not significantly affect the lives of the inhabitants of the peripheries, and effective, meaningful incorporation, on which I focus in the paper and, for brevity, call ‘state incorporation.’
involved considerable expansion of public service provision and construction of physical infrastructure that connects the region with the Ethiopian, Kenyan, and Ugandan economies. They have facilitated trade and other economic activity. At the same time, state encroachment on the previous autonomy of the local, primarily pastoralist, populations has not always been welcomed. The tensions between the state and drylanders have at times escalated into outright, and deadly, conflict.

The costs imposed on both governments and local populations by such conflict can be reduced through implementation of policies that accord with the preferences of local populations. Alternatively, if those preferences preclude the realization of government objectives, policies can be modified in less dramatic ways in an effort to alter local populations’ preferences. In this paper I present the results of a conjoint experiment intended to determine such preferences and the degree to which they can be altered by changes to the predicted consequences of government policies or attributes of individuals responsible for the implementation of those policies. Specifically, I investigate the preferences concerning incorporation of local populations into states and of local leaders in to state-based decision-making processes, delegation of responsibility for implementation of important projects to those leaders, and local responses to unwelcome government policies. I find that in the drylands both local leaders and regular members of local populations have strong preferences for specific policies and responses. At the same time, these preferences can be affected at the margin by policy components. Individual attributes have stronger effects on local preferences concerning leaders, which are weaker and more malleable. These findings have important implications for governments, the number of which appears to be growing, that seek to effectively project state
power in peripheral areas. More broadly, they point to the importance of accommodating local preferences in the design and implementation of other policies and interventions; they suggest ways in which governments—or, for that matter, other organizations such as development and humanitarian bodies—can modify such policies and interventions to facilitate local adoption. They also contribute to the scholarly literatures on state-making and preferences.

**State-making and preferences**

State-making is in large part the process through which states acquire—or, at times, lose—the ability to project their power across their territories and, therefore, govern those territories’ inhabitants. Due to variation in levels of state capacity, mutability of state borders, and difficulty of access, this ability has typically been uneven, producing political peripheries such as the drylands (Boone 2012: 626; Herbst 2000: 22). The existence of peripheries can be attributed, however, as much to the attractiveness of statelessness—and, therefore, evasion of state power—for their inhabitants as to the limits of such power. As Scott observes, the residents of peripheries, or, more specifically, the peoples of Southeast Asian ‘Zomia,’ “are best understood as runaway, fugitive, maroon communities who have, over the course of two millennia, been fleeing the oppressions of state-making projects” (Scott 2009: ix). He acknowledges, however, that the time when such evasion of state power was feasible is coming to an end (Ibid.: ix). Indeed, several recent scholarly contributions suggest that not only parts of Zomia (Jones 2004), but also other areas elsewhere in Southeast Asia (Eilenberg 2009) as well as in the drylands of East Africa and the Horn (Czuba forthcoming; Mosley and Watson 2016) are experiencing extension of states’ ability, and willingness, to project their power in previously neglected peripheries. However, evidence of local populations’ opinions about incorporation into states is limited to indirect, and somewhat far-fetched, suppositions about their desire to isolate themselves from the state. Examination of local attitudes towards extension of state power provides, therefore, a valuable addition to the existing literature on the subject—and, as I will discuss later in the paper, challenges some of the claims made by scholars. In addition, African states’ efforts to extend their power in previously neglected areas challenge the received wisdom that establishment of meaningful control over their peripheries is not in the interest of the continent’s governments (Herbst 2000; Jackson 1991; Jackson and Rosberg 1982).
To exercise such control, governments need to develop administrative capacity. While they can displace existing governance arrangements and local political elites in favor of new structures and officials imported from outside the newly incorporated peripheries, this option requires considerable effort and expense. Furthermore, removal of existing power structures can undermine political order and lead to local resistance to government actions, necessitating further expenditure (e.g. Kapelle 1979). For this reason, rulers have historically often delegated the responsibility for administration of territories newly brought under their control to local political elites (e.g. Eisenstadt 1963; Naseemullah and Staniland 2014; Wimmer 2013: 43). In Sub-Saharan Africa, this attitude has found most prominent expression in colonial-era indirect rule through chiefs and other customary leaders (e.g. Mamdani 1996); Africanist literature indicates that the political influence of such customary leaders persists in contemporary politics as well (Baldwin 2014).

In the dryland region, in the absence of the state and its representatives, most governance functions have been historically performed by local customary leaders, such as the Karimojong, Nyangatom, Pokot, and Turkana elders or the gadaa grade leaders, haayyuu, and other leaders of the complex Borana governance system (e.g. Asmarom 1973: 93; Bassi 2005: 243-244 and 272-274; Baxter 1978: 153-154; Bollig 2000: 345-346; Gebre 2014: 55; Glowacki and van Rueden 2015: 9; Gulliver 1953: 147-158; Knighton 1990: 279-300; Mercy 2016: 52-53; Tornay 1981: 161-167). Extension of state power in the region threatens the autonomy that customary leaders previously enjoyed. Furthermore, since few such leaders have attained formal education or developed familiarity with the state in other ways, their ability to take advantage of governments’ willingness to delegate administrative responsibilities has been limited. Instead, these new opportunities have for the most part benefitted members of emergent alternative leadership classes composed of individuals who have gone to schools, become acquainted with the state and its practices, and, for this reason, found themselves well-positioned to serve as the primary intermediaries between local populations and governments. In the recent past these ‘new leaders,’ as I refer to them, have accumulated considerable influence. Among administrators appointed to represent government interests in the drylands, this power derives from their relationship with the state; the most influential new leaders occupy, however, elected offices, such as those of members of parliament and local assemblies and, in Kenya, governors, which position them as representatives of the local populations within the state’s political system. As a result of the new leaders’ recent ascendancy, the power of customary leaders has generally (but not always) been

The new leaders have been the greatest beneficiaries of extension of state power in the drylands. Regular inhabitants of the region have not, however, necessarily lost out, although their experience has been more mixed. In recent years, the governments of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda have established in the drylands new administrative divisions and deployed or recruited large numbers of administrators and military and police personnel. For the first time in the region’s history, most of its inhabitants have direct access to representatives of the state. Plot 1, which presents the results of a question asked as part of a survey that I conducted (I provide more information about the survey in the research design section of the paper), indicates the scale of the expansion of government presence in the drylands. The newly constructed administrative apparatus in the region has been used to greatly expand government provision of public services, including in areas that until recently received no such services at all (Plot 2). As I explain later in the paper, this expansion has been uneven; nevertheless, the new education, healthcare, and other services have begun to improve the lives of the inhabitants of the region, which remains one of the poorest places in the world. Physical infrastructure in the region, proxied by the distance to transport connections, has also been expanded (Plot 3). Insecurity in the drylands, historically a very violent region, has meanwhile greatly declined (Plot 4). Regular drylanders’ experience of extension of state power has not
been, however, uniformly positive. Despite improved security conditions, government interference in the region has led to tensions with local populations and, on occasion, to clashes such as those in Suguta Valley near Baragoi in Samburu District in November 2012, when local Samburu killed forty-two Kenyan police officers (Greiner 2013: 216). Furthermore, the long-vulnerable pastoral livelihood systems on which the drylanders have historically relied have continued to erode in the period concurrent with extension of state power (proxied by the change in the number of livestock in the fifteen years prior to 2016; Plot 5).

These consequences of extension of state power have shaped drylanders’ experiences of engagement with the state. Along with other life events, individual calculuses of personal interests and objectives, and other factors, these experiences have in turn formed the political preferences of different members of the local populations. The study of political preferences—which James N. Druckman and Arthur Lupia define as “comparative evaluation of a set of objects”—has been prominent in Political Science (see Druckman and Lupia 2000). Most of the scholarly contributions on the subject have focused on preference formation (perhaps most notably Druckman and Lupia 2000 and 2016; but also e.g. Blom-Hansen et al. 2016; Fuchs-Schuendeln and Schuendeln; Mullinix 2018; Vössing and Weber 2017). Some work has investigated the geographic distribution of preferences (Rodden 2010), as well as on the impact of geographically-defined identities on preference formation (Davidson et al. 2017). More broadly, a number of influential studies has considered the impact of in-group identities on preference formation (Alesina, Baqir, and Easterly 1999; Habyarimana et al. 2007). Conversely, a more limited body of research indicates that preferences shape action (Dawes et al. 2011; Fowler 2006; Fowler and Kam 2006; Loewen 2010). If this is the case, the drylanders’ thus far unexamined preferences concerning extension of state power in their region will influence
subsequent stages of the process and the nature of future state-society relations in the drylands and, by extension, elsewhere in Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda. Overall, however, the evidence of causal relationships between preferences and action remains limited. In particular, as Dawes et al. (2011) suggest, there is great need to explore the malleability of preferences. While the use of experiments in the study of preferences has been growing in recent years (Davidson et al.; Dawes et al. 2011; Druckman and Bolsen 2012; Habyarimana et al. 2007; Loewen 2010; Vössing and Weber 2017), to my knowledge no scholarship to date has attempted to use experimental methods—perfectly suited to this task—to examine preference malleability by varying factors that may potentially exert influence on preference formation. In addition, some exceptions notwithstanding (e.g. Gottlieb et al. 2016), the study of political preferences in the African context is severely lacking. Relatively, no studies examining the preferences of agents involved in state-making processes have been conducted. In this paper, I help to overcome these limitations of the existing literature through experimental investigation of the preferences of both political agents and regular citizens involved in or otherwise affected by the ongoing process of extension of state power in the drylands as well as the malleability of those preferences.

Theory and hypotheses
Extension of state power in peripheries simultaneously brings to an end local populations’ previous autonomy—and the benefits of the ‘art of not being governed’—and offers access to state-provided public goods and new opportunities for political advancement. Peripheral populations, especially if their prior engagement with the state was very limited may be, however, unaware of the advantages of effective incorporation into that state. Furthermore, given the typical imbalance of power between such populations and the state, resistance to state incorporation poses much greater risks to the former. Nevertheless, if a particular government is oppressive, and especially if it has historically engaged in punitive actions against the inhabitants of the newly incorporated periphery, the attractiveness of state-provided public goods diminishes. These claims can be restated in the form of a testable hypothesis:

H1. The probability that local populations and their leaders will prefer state incorporation increases with the history of non-confrontational engagement with the state.
Following the initiation of extension of state power, it is typically in government interest to delegate—as so many other governments have done in the course of the history of state-making—the authority for administration of the newly incorporated periphery to local leaders. Such delegation can, nonetheless, take several different forms located on a spectrum that extends from imposition of the existing state structures in the periphery to local leaders’ full incorporation into the state’s political system. In the first scenario, local leaders either function as the state’s representatives in the periphery or compete for influence within that state’s political system, for example in the course of elections for political office. In the second, local leaders—and the governance systems over which they preside—are incorporated as a class into the structures of the state. In the drylands, the Ethiopian, Kenyan, and Ugandan governments have mostly made use of the first method of delegation of authority to local leaders. In parts of the Kenyan drylands, however, customary local leaders have been partly incorporated into state structures through the creation of (primarily county-level) ‘councils of elders,’ while in Nyangatom in the Ethiopian drylands the new leadership class has been effectively fully incorporated in this manner, largely because of the small size of the local elite (Interviews: EO92, senior official, Nyangatom Woreda administration, interviewed in Kangaten, Ethiopia on the 2nd September 2016; KE401, Pokot elder, member of the West Pokot Council of Elders, interviewed in Kacheliba, Kenya on the 1st October 2016). Elite incorporation offers the greatest benefits to customary leaders, whose ability to make use of the opportunities offered by state incorporation is usually constrained by their limited formal education and previous exposure to the state. It can also help new leaders if it insulates them from demands placed upon them by their superiors in governments or, if those leaders are elected, by constituents. For regular drylanders, elite incorporation promises the preservation of the pre-existing channels of accountability that may, in their assessment, surpass those instituted by the state. For these reasons, incorporation of local leaders into the state apparatus is likely to be preferred locally. However, local populations also respond to state policies; if a government demonstrates its unwillingness to incorporate local leaders, imposition emerges as the more attractive option, at least as long as those leaders can attain a degree of influence over the state apparatus and protect their own and local populations’ interests. From the preceding discussion I derive the following hypothesis:

H2. The probability that local populations and their leaders will prefer elite incorporation is high and increases when states accommodate local leaders.
Governments not only choose the method used to delegate authority. In some cases they also directly appoint specific individuals to implement government policies or other important projects, such as development interventions. Where more than one local leadership category exists, as is the case in the drylands, delegation of such responsibility to a member of the category to which the local population and leaders prefer to entrust the administration of the policy or project can strongly influence local support and, therefore, the probability of success of the intervention. Preferences concerning the identity of individuals selected to implement such interventions are likely to reflect the interests of specific members of local populations. Local leaders can be assumed to generally prefer members of the same leadership category, with whom they share personal outlook and ‘class’ interest. At the same time, if the methods of apportioning power within a leadership category are not clearly defined, as is the case among the new leaders in the drylands, who compete with one another for influence, including through elections—but not within the customary governance systems, in which distribution of power is typically well-defined—that category’s members may prefer to entrust the responsibility to a member of the other leadership class. I predict that the preferences of the general population depend on its assessment of the accountability of the leadership categories and their ability to provide public goods to their constituents.

**H3.** As long as intra-category competition is limited, local leaders will generally prefer members of their own leadership categories. Regular members of local populations will prefer members of the category that they believe to be more accountable and effective.

Accommodation of local preferences in implementation of government policies and projects can increase local support for such interventions. Nevertheless, since the interests of governments and local populations are never completely aligned, the latter are likely to find some of those interventions disagreeable. Local reaction to unwelcome government actions can involve outright—and possibly violent—opposition or efforts to negotiate a mutually acceptable solution. Given the power gap between the state and peripheral populations, most of them can be assumed to prefer negotiations to the riskier opposition, at least as long as they believe that negotiations can

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\(^4\) I use the term in a very general sense.
be successful. This preference is likely to further increase if the government’s previous heavy-handedness in its interactions with the local population indicates that outright opposition is a dangerous choice. On the other hand, if such prior heavy-handedness has given rise to local grievances against the state or the success of negotiations is believed to be unlikely, opposition can emerge as a more attractive option.

**H4.** Most local populations will prefer to negotiate a solution to an unwelcome government policy, especially if outright opposition is unusually risky. When they believe that such negotiations are unlikely to succeed or have longstanding grievances against the state, the probability that opposition will be preferred increases.

The preceding discussion indicates that taking local preferences into account can increase local support for government actions. In this respect, such preferences constitute an important determinant of the efficaciousness of states’ efforts to extend their power in peripheries and, by extension, help to shape broader state-making processes. Local populations can, however, resist important components of government agendas. Preferences for independence, elite incorporation, customary leaders, and opposition can be difficult to accommodate for governments determined to extend their power in peripheries, impose their existing political systems in the newly integrated territories, work with new leaders—who, after all, are typically better positioned to interact with the state—and avoid direct, and potentially costly, confrontation with local populations. As a matter of fact, these approaches—which are at odds with local preferences—have for the most part characterized the Ethiopian, Kenyan, and Ugandan governments’ efforts to extend their power in the drylands. The contrast between government positions and local preferences can help to explain why state-society relations in the region have at times been tense despite the considerable expansion of government public service provision. Local preferences are not, however, necessarily set in stone. If such preferences are malleable, what actions can governments take to alter them and increase local support for state incorporation and specific policies and projects? The experimental approach employed in this paper allows me investigate the effect of various factors on respondents’ preferences. These preferences concern the issues explored in the previous hypotheses: state incorporation and independence, delegation of authority to local elites, the identity of preferred leaders, and responses to unwelcome government policies. In the following
 paragraphs I discuss the factors—personal attributes of local leaders and potential consequences of government policies—that I predict to affect local preferences.

Local preferences for independence and elite incorporation can be explained in large part by satisfaction with the status quo and aversion to change. After all, the ‘art of not being governed’—that is, both existing governance arrangements and autonomy from the state—served local populations residing on the margins of the state, including the inhabitants of the drylands, relatively well (see Scott 2009). Radical change, even if it results in increased access to state-provided public goods, threatens the established ways of life. Although in the drylands extension of state power has involved reduction of violence, state incorporation can easily turn violent. Furthermore, in the drylands the process has unfolded concurrently with erosion of the pastoral livelihood systems on which the region’s inhabitants have historically relied. Extension of state power also threatens the influence of individual local leaders and of local leadership categories; thus, in the drylands, the role of customary leaders has diminished in the recent years. If the threats posed by government policies are reduced, local preferences for those policies over alternatives are likely to increase; conversely, detrimental consequences of policies can be expected to reduce preferences in their favor. Specifically, I predict that the preferences of regular members of local populations will be most strongly affected by threats to their personal safety and wealth as well as the security and economic wellbeing of their communities, while local leaders will respond to changes in personal influence and wealth as well in the influence of their leadership category and economic wellbeing of their communities.

**H5.** The probability that regular people will prefer state incorporation, independence, elite incorporation, and imposition increases if a particular policy poses no threat to their personal safety and wealth as well as to the security and wellbeing of their communities, compared to a policy that poses such a threat. The probability that local leaders’ will prefer the same policies increases if a particular policy poses no threat to their personal influence and wealth as well to the influence of their leadership category and economic wellbeing of their communities, compared to a policy that poses such a threat.

Local response to government actions can be further affected by the attributes of individuals to whom the responsibility for implementation of policies and projects is delegated. Local populations are more likely to trust an individual who has strong ties with the communities affected by the interventions that she or he administers. Given such individuals’ role as
intermediaries between the local populations and the state, strong connections with the government can also be valuable. Relatedly, formal education affords local leaders both greater knowledge of the state—and, therefore, reduces the risk of their being taken advantage of by the government—and the enhances their ability to effectively administer government interventions. Personal wealth can elicit suspicion, but can also be thought to decrease the probability of corrupt use of intervention resources; in addition, it can elevate individuals’ status in their communities.

**H6.** The probability that a particular individual will be preferred increases when she or he has strong ties to the local community and the government, a high education attainment, and personal wealth.

The local preference for a response to unwelcome government actions can be affected by the predicted consequences of such a response. Local populations will naturally prefer actions that are successful. The preference can also be shaped, however, by the threat of sanctions that the government can impose on local populations.

**H7.** The probability that either opposition or negotiations to a government action will be preferred increases with the likelihood of success of a particular response and decreases with the likelihood of sanctions.

**Research design and methods**

In my investigation I not only examine the preferences of agents across the entire dryland region, but also compare them across different areas and ethnic groups, whose territories extend across national borders. Three subgroups of the Ateker Cluster live in adjacent areas divided by the borders of the three countries: the Nyangatom in Nyangatom Woreda in the Lower Omo Valley in Ethiopia, the Turkana in Turkana County in the northwestern corner of Kenya, and the Karimojong in Moroto District in Uganda. The Pokot live in both West Pokot County in Kenya and in Amudat District in Uganda. The Borana occupy Borena Zone in Ethiopia and Marsabit County in Kenya. In this design, which I illustrate in Table 1 and Map 2, at least two ethnic groups from each of the three countries are represented in the study.

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5 A small number of Karimojong responses for the project were collected in Nakapiripirit District. For simplicity, in this paper I present the responses from Nakapiripirit and Moroto together.
6 I list only those administrative divisions in which data were collected for the project. Members of these ethnic groups also reside in other areas.
Table 1. Research design

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Map 2. Research areas

Data for the project were collected between January and December 2016 in sixty-five research sites in the drylands and in Addis Ababa, Kampala, and Nairobi. I provide the list of research sites in Appendix 1. The project takes the form of a conjoint survey experiment. The respondents were presented with a set of vignettes, the components of which—specified in hypotheses 5-7—were randomly varied in order to identify which components of the treatment produce specific causal effects. This survey experiment method—referred to variously as (discrete) choice experiments, (factorial) vignettes, factorial surveys, and conjoint analysis—is
particularly well-suited to the analysis of agents’ preferences and choices because it takes into account the inherent multidimensionality of political behavior (Banerjee et al. 2014; Hainmueller et al. 2014; Harrell et al. 2012; Martin 2006; Taylor 2006).

Respondents included regular inhabitants of the drylands and two categories of political agents:

- Local customary leaders: elders and, among the Borana, *gadaa* leaders representing all the ethnic groups considered in the project.
- Local new leaders: politicians\(^7\) and government officials employed in local administration\(^8\) who belong to each of the ethnic groups considered in the project.

The respondents were presented with a set of vignettes that correspond to the individual profiles and scenarios detailed in the previous section of the paper. *First*, they were presented with scenario-based vignettes (Duch and Palmer 2004) intended to measure preferences related to state and elite incorporation and response to unwelcome government policies. Because of the content of the vignettes, there were small differences, explained in the previous section (see Hypothesis 5), between the vignettes administered to local leaders and regular members of local populations. *Second*, I used profile-based vignettes (Banerjee et al. 2014; Carlson 2015; Conroy-Krutz 2013; Hainmueller e al. 2014; Harrell et al. 2012) to measure respondents’ preferences concerning local leaders responsible for implementation of important government projects. Profile-based vignettes administered to all respondents were identical. The experiment instruments can be found in Appendix 2.

In the research instrument intended for local leaders, the components of the vignettes were randomly varied within respondents in order to identify which components of the treatment produce specific causal effects (Conroy-Krutz 2013; Harrell et al. 2012). To this end, each vignette—containing different, randomly varied, components—was presented to each respondent three times (Nickerson 2005). A small number of respondents refused to complete three sets of vignettes. Altogether, 1,692 responses were collected from local leaders. Due to the challenges of recruiting political agents, some of them very high-ranking, the sample of local leaders is a

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\(^7\) Current and former members of parliament; parliamentary candidates; chairmen, vice-chairpersons, speakers, other leaders and members of local assemblies—including county assemblies in Kenya and district and sub-county local councils in Uganda—and, in Kenya, a deputy governor and members of county executive committees.

\(^8\) Kebele, woreda, and zonal administration in Ethiopia; sub-location, location, sub-county, and county administration in Kenya; village, parish, sub-county, municipal, and district administration in Uganda.
convenience sample; however, large proportions of the most important local leaders involved in extension of state power in the drylands participated in the experiments.

The version of the conjoint experiment meant for regular inhabitants of the drylands was administered as part of a survey of the local population. I have presented some observational data from the survey earlier in the paper. 1,180 survey responses were collected from regular drylanders. Due to financial limitations, data collection for the survey relied on cluster sampling; clusters were created to represent population resident in administrative centers, smaller towns or trading centers, and non-urban areas located both in the vicinity of administrative centers and in outlying areas of the administrative divisions.

The vignettes were presented to new leaders in English and translated into local languages—Afaan Borana, Ng’ala Pokot, and Ateker languages (Ngakarimojong, Nganyangatom, and Ngaturkana)—for customary leaders and regular drylanders. In addition to experimental data on respondents’ preferences, I collected observational data on the subject—in the form of questions identical to those posed in the experimental instrument sections, but without the randomly varied components—intended for robustness checks. I disaggregate the number of responses per instrument, country, area, and ethnic group in Appendix 3. The data were collected using Qualtrics software and cleaned and analyzed in RStudio using base R and cjoint, dplyr, forcats, ggplot2, magrittr, stargazer, tidyverse, and xtable packages (Bache and Wickham 2014; Dahl 2016; Hainmueller et al. 2014; Hlavac 2018; R Core Team 2013; RStudio Team 2016; Wickham 2016 and 2018; Wickham and Henry 2018; Wickham et al. 2018).

The experiment is a choice-based conjoint design in which the equivalents of the binary outcome observational questions are complemented with randomly varied components specified in hypotheses 5-7. Because of the randomization and the resulting orthogonality of each component with respect to every other, estimation of treatment effects is straightforward. I follow the statistical approach developed in Hainmueller et al. (2014) and estimate average marginal component effects (AMCEs), which represent the average difference in the probability of being preferred when comparing different component values. Because of the format of the conjoint experiment, in which respondents were presented with two policies or profiles (which were not randomly varied), each of which had several randomly varied attributes or components, I present the observational and experimental results—that is, the respondents’ choices of policies/profiles
and the effect of the components—separately. Due to the orthogonality of the components the observational results represent each respondent’s choice with the components held constant.

Alongside data collection for the conjoint experiment and survey, I conducted several interviews with local leaders, government officials, and other knowledgeable individuals. I cite some of those interviews in the paper.

Results

1. Preferences

1.1. State incorporation or independence
Since the ethnic groups that inhabit the drylands have their own well-established governance systems and state presence in the region remained negligible for a century following its nominal incorporation into the Ethiopian, Kenyan, and Ugandan polities, extension of state power is not necessarily a desirable phenomenon from the perspective of local leaders—who until recently enjoyed uncontested authority over their coethnics—and regular drylanders, accustomed to the existing distribution of power in their societies. When asked if they prefer effective incorporation into the state or return to the quasi-independent past, most respondents chose, however, the former option. 67 percent of regular drylanders, 63 percent of customary leaders, and 66 percent of new leaders preferred incorporation. The differences across instruments are, therefore, small, but it is notable that customary leaders, to whose influence extension of state power poses the greatest threat, display the weakest preference for state incorporation. At the same time, variation across countries and areas of the drylands is considerable. Among regular drylanders, preference for independence was far stronger in Uganda than in the other two countries, and especially in Turkana, where respondents displayed a very strong preference for incorporation (Plot 6). This result can be attributed to the repression that inhabitants of the Ugandan drylands have faced since the brutal disarmament and the relative lack of government public service provision in

![Plot 6. Regular drylanders’ preference for state incorporation or independence](image)

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Amudat and Moroto (Czuba forthcoming; Howe et al. 2015), which contrasts with the rapid expansion of such service provision in both Ethiopian and Kenyan sections of the drylands (Mosley and Watson 2016). The Nyangatom customary leaders were unique in displaying a preference for independence (Plot 7). This result, and their regular coethnics’ relatively weak preference for incorporation, can be attributed to the short history of the engagement of the Nyangatom with the Ethiopian state, which, more so than elsewhere in the drylands, was essentially nonexistent until the late 2000s (Mercy 2017). Kenyan customary leaders, and especially those in Marsabit and Turkana, expressed a much stronger preference for state incorporation than their Ugandan counterparts; this result may reflect the relative influence of such customary leaders, in particular in Marsabit (Czuba 2017), in contemporary local politics in Northern Kenya as much as it does the expansion of public service provision in the country. Given their status as primary intermediaries between local populations and the state, new leaders’ preference for state incorporation does not surprise (Plot 8). Among new leaders, variation across areas is also limited with the exception of Nyangatom. These results are in line with Hypothesis 1.

1.2. Elite incorporation or imposition

69 percent of regular drylanders, 81 percent of customary leaders, and 63 percent of new leaders preferred elite incorporation. Since the introduction of new political systems with which they are not familiar directly threatens customary leaders, their preference is not surprising. New leaders’ relatively strong preference for elite incorporation can be attributed to their unease at the risks inherent to such systems, whether they derive their authority from appointment by the government or elections by local populations. Regular drylanders’ preference likely reflects their overall
satisfaction with their leaders. The results of the regular drylanders and customary leaders (but not new leaders) instruments reveal, however, considerable variation. Among regular drylanders, Kenyans preferred elite incorporation by a wide margin, Ugandans—much more weakly. The residents of Nyangatom were unique in displaying preference for imposition, while their Moroto kin were equally divided (Plot 9). The Ugandan preference for imposition reflects that country’s government’s refusal to engage with local leaders except through the political system that it imposed in its section of the drylands (Czuba forthcoming); the local population presumably recognizes that elite incorporation is not a feasible option. The Kenyan preference for elite incorporation can be attributed to the relative success of the councils of elders established in Northern Kenyan counties (Czuba 2017; Interviews: KE401, Pokot elder, member of the West Pokot Council of Elders, interviewed in Kacheliba, Kenya on the 1st October 2016; KO8, member of parliament from Turkana County, interviewed in Nairobi on the 7th March 2016). The preference for imposition in Nyangatom is more difficult to explained given the effective incorporation of the area’s new leaders into the local administrative apparatus. Among customary leaders, the preference for incorporation was strongest in Marsabit and in Turkana (Plot 10). This result likely reflects customary leaders’ recognition of the power and resources commanded by the Kenyan state, which since the enactment of the country’s new constitution in 2013 have been devolved to county governments, as well as the unusually prominent role that customary leaders play in Marsabit’s local political system (Czuba 2017; Interview: KE2, Turkana elder, interviewed in Nadapal, Kenya on the 4th April 2016). Overall, the results provide support for Hypothesis 2.
1.3. Customary or new leaders

Asked about their preference concerning the leader responsible for administration of an important project, 54 percent of regular drylanders chose a customary leader. 66 percent of customary leaders and 52 percent of new leaders preferred a member of the same leadership category. Customary leaders were preferred by regular drylanders in Borena, Marsabit, Moroto, and Turkana (Plot 12). This result reflects, on the one hand, the local distrust of the Borena and Moroto new leaders, who have been used by the Ethiopian and Ugandan governments to enforce their will on local populations (Czuba forthcoming; Interview: EO4, civil servant, Culture and Tourism Office, Borena Zone Administration, interviewed in Yabelo, Ethiopia on the 10th July 2016) and, on the other, the close ties that customary leaders in both the two areas and in Marsabit and Turkana continue to maintain with local populations (Czuba 2017; Interviews: EE51, Borana haayyuu meedichaa, interviewed in Badassa, Ethiopia on the 8th July 2016; KA21, Turkana development worker, interviewed in Lodwar on the 9th January 2018; UO3, former member of parliament from Karamoja, interviewed in Kampala on the 14th October 2016). The Amudat, Nyangatom, and West Pokot inhabitants’ preference for new leaders can be attributed to the successful defense of their coethnics’ interests by members of this leadership category (Interviews: EO71, civil servant, Nyangatom Woreda administration, interviewed in Kangaten, Ethiopia on the 29th August 2016; KE401, Pokot elder, member of the West Pokot Council of Elders, interviewed in Kacheliba, Kenya on the 1st October 2016; UO5, Pokot senior LC5 official, Amudat District, interviewed in Amudat on the 17th October 2016). Among customary leaders, those in Kenya displayed the strongest preference for customary leaders (Plot 13). The preference for customary leaders was weakest in Amudat and West Pokot.
and strongest in Marsabit and Turkana, presumably for the reasons mentioned above. Interestingly, in Nyangatom customary leaders, likely due to their good relations with new leaders who have effectively represented their interests in the course of interactions with the Ethiopian government, expressed a weak preference for new leaders. Variation among new leaders was limited (Plot 14). The results provide some, but admittedly quite limited, support for Hypothesis 3.

1.4. Opposition or negotiations

The previous questions reveal drylanders’ preferences concerning the form of extension of state power and the identity of agents responsible for shaping the process. Equally important is their determination to make these preferences a reality. To measure it, I asked respondents about their preferred course of action in the event that the government adopted a policy that they found disagreeable. 68 percent of regular drylanders and 73 percent of customary and new leaders chose negotiations. Among regular drylanders (Plot 15), Ugandan respondents displayed a much stronger preference for negotiations than those in Ethiopia and Kenya, likely because of their direct experience of the dangers of the authoritarian National Resistance Movement government, which initiated extension of state power in its section of the drylands through a brutal disarmament campaign that involved extensive human rights violations (e.g. Bevan 2008). At the area level, the preference for negotiations was strongest in Amudat, Marsabit, Moroto, and West Pokot, and weakest in Borena, Nyangatom, and Turkana. The results in Amudat and West Pokot may reflect preference for negotiations ingrained in Pokot codes of conduct; those in the other areas divide, however, (pan-)ethnic groups. The weak Borena preference for negotiations can be attributed to the adversarial relationship between
the Ethiopian Borana and the ruling Ethiopian People’s Revolutionary Democratic Front (EPRDF) regime; since the early 1990s, Borena has been the location of a low-intensity insurgency (Fekadu 2011). Among customary leaders (Plot 16), the preference for negotiations was nearly universal in Nyangatom and Turkana, where those leaders have benefitted from the local population’s good relationship with the state and expansion of public service provision. In contrast, in Borena, where customary leaders’ decision to resist the EPRDF government’s efforts to extend its power in the area has proved very costly and generated widespread grievances against the regime, they display analogous preference for opposition. Variation among new leaders was again limited (Plot 17). These results accord with the predictions of Hypothesis 4.

![Plot 16. Customary leaders' preference for opposition or negotiations](image)

![Plot 17. New leaders' preference for opposition or negotiations](image)

2. Preference malleability

The inhabitants of the drylands evidently have strong preferences concerning most of the aspects of extension of state power in the region investigated in the paper. In this section of the paper I examine the effects that manipulation of the components specified in hypotheses 5-7 has on these preferences.

2.1. State incorporation or independence

Most drylanders’ preference for state incorporation accords with government objectives. In addition, the conjoint experiment demonstrates that the strength of the preexisting preference is such that in most cases addition of the randomly varied components has minimal effects on that preference. The effects follow the directions specified in Hypothesis 5; that is, the lack of reduction of personal and community economic wellbeing, (in the survey instrument) personal and
community safety, and (in the local leaders’ instruments) personal and leadership category influence increases the probability of choosing a given policy. I present the results in plots 18-20.9 However, the results are not statistically significant with the following exceptions. Among customary leaders, only the effect of the communal economic cost is significant, at the 0.05 level: unexpectedly, the preference for state incorporation decreases by 9 percent when the economic cost of state incorporation for the local population is low. This result could be indicative to the respondents’ limited concern for the wellbeing of their coethnics, at least in comparison with the more self-regarding components, although the effect of all the components are evidently overshadowed by the respondents’ strong preference for state incorporation. Among new leaders, only the effects of independence on personal and class influence are statistically significant, at the 0.05 and 0.01 levels. When independence results in no change in personal and class influence, the preference for state incorporation decreases by 7 and 8 percent, respectively. The full regression model is displayed in Appendix 4. Due to space limitations, I do not discuss the results disaggregated by area in the paper; in any case, the limited effects and sample sizes mean that results are generally not statistically significant. However, I present those results in Appendix 5. The results offer limited support for Hypothesis 5.

**Plot 18.** The malleability of regular drylanders’ preference for state incorporation or independence

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9 The dots in the plot report the point estimates and the lines—95% confidence intervals for the AMCE of each component values on the probability of respondents selecting either of the presented policies. The dots without confidence intervals denote reference categories.
Plot 19. The malleability of customary leaders’ preference for state incorporation or independence

Plot 20. The malleability of new leaders’ preference for state incorporation or independence

2.2. Elite incorporation or imposition

The effects of the specified factors on the choice of elite incorporation or imposition also follow the pattern predicted by Hypothesis 5 (plots 21-23). None of the effects are significant for regular drylanders and customary leaders. Among new leaders, the probability of selecting elite incorporation increases by 7 percent when it does not result in reduction of personal wealth and class influence and decreases by the same amount when imposition does not result in reduction of personal wealth. These results are significant at the 0.05 level. Overall, the results offer very limited support for Hypothesis 5.
Plot 21. The malleability of regular drylanders’ preference for elite incorporation or imposition

Plot 22. The malleability of customary leaders’ preference for elite incorporation or imposition

Plot 23. The malleability of new leaders’ preference for elite incorporation or imposition
2.3. Customary or new leader

Drylanders’ preference for members of the two local leadership categories is weak. In this context, for the first time, the effects of the randomly varied individual attributes on preference for the presented profile of a customary or new leader are strong, and statistically significant. These effects generally follow the pattern predicted by Hypothesis 6 (plots 24-26). Among regular drylanders, the probability of choosing a customary leader increases by 10 percent when he has attained extensive formal education and decreases by 10 percent when the new leader has strong ties to the government; both results are significant at the 0.001 level. Customary leaders’ preferences are most strongly affected by the customary leader’s ties to the local community and education (with the probability of choosing that leader increased by 14 and 9 percent, respectively) and the new leader’s local ties (20 percent); the effects are significant at the 0.001 or 0.05 level. Among new leaders, for the first time, the effects of the randomly varied attributes are stronger than that of the preference for one of the profiles or policies. The effects are slightly stronger for the profiles of new leaders than for the profiles of customary leaders. Thus, the probability of choosing a customary leader increases by 9 percent when that leader has strong ties to the government, by 20 percent when he has strong ties to the local community, and by 11 percent when he is highly educated. The probability decreases by 9 percent when a new leader has strong ties to the government, by 17 percent when she has strong ties to the local community, and by 7 percent when she is highly educated. All these results are significant. The effect of wealth, in this and other instruments, is small and not significant. Overall, the results provide support for Hypothesis 6.

Plot 24. The malleability of regular drylanders’ preference for a customary or new leader
2.4. Opposition or negotiations

Drylanders’ preferences concerning their response to an unwelcome government policy are understandably affected by the likelihood of success (plots 27-29). This result is statistically significant at the 0.001 level in the customary and new leaders instruments. The hypothetical imposition of sanctions by the government intended to affect the local response has, however, no significant effect. The results do not provide support for Hypothesis 7.
Plot 27. The malleability of regular drylanders’ preference for opposition or negotiations

Plot 28. The malleability of customary leaders’ preference for opposition or negotiations

Plot 29. The malleability of new leaders’ preference for opposition or negotiations
Conclusion

As states continue to increase their ability to project power across the peripheries inhabited by historically stateless societies, the viability of such societies’ complex political and socioeconomic arrangements, in some cases developed to keep the state at arm’s length, diminishes and avoidance of state rule becomes progressively more difficult. With the ‘art of not being governed’ often impossible to practice, populations of erstwhile peripheries face the many ‘choices of being governed’ by states. Such choices, the ways in which local populations and their leaders decide to interact with states, are shaped by preferences. These preferences, previously unexamined by the state-making literature, offer valuable insights into processes of extension of state power such as the one that is currently unfolding in the drylands of Ethiopia, Kenya, and Uganda.

Drylanders’ strong preference for incorporation into the three states challenges the Scottian narrative of resistance to state rule. Although it does not necessarily directly contradict Scott’s argument—the political processes that he discusses have taken place in a spatial and temporal context very different from contemporary drylands—it points to the attractiveness of the state and the public goods that it provides, even if they come at the cost of decreased local autonomy. Local populations’ other preferences—concerning delegation of authority to local elites, the identity of leaders trusted to implement important interventions, and responses to disagreeable government policies—are, however, at odds with the Ethiopian, Kenyan, and Ugandan governments’ actions in the drylands. While, with the exception of the effects of randomly varied components, the research design of the project I discuss in the paper does not allow me to make reliable causal claims, it is plausible that the gap between local preferences and government actions accounts for at least some of the tensions that the region has experienced since the initiation of extension of state power.

The relatively weak effects of most of the experimental components indicate that the specific changes to government policies that I predicted to alter local preferences are unlikely to reduce such tensions. Accommodation of existing preferences offers a higher probability of success. Nevertheless, the experimental results suggest that, at the margin, those preferences can be altered. In some situations, weak effects can help to shape preferences and, by extension, conceivably behavior. This is particularly true when existing preferences are weak, as is the case with the preference for leaders responsible for administration of policies and projects in the drylands. The results reveal that the effects of such individuals’ randomly varied attributes are
stronger than the preference for either of the two leadership categories. Preferences can, therefore, be altered, but such malleability appears to be limited.

Appendices

Appendix 1. Research sites
Some of the new leaders data collection took place in Addis Ababa, Kampala, and Nairobi. Other data collection took place in sixty-five research sites in the drylands.

Kenya

Marsabit County

Customary leaders:
- Badassa, Saku Sub-county
- Dirib Gombo, Saku Sub-county
- Dubgoba, Saku Sub-county

New leaders:
- Marsabit, Saku Sub-county

Survey:
- Badassa, Saku Sub-county
- Boru Haro, Saku Sub-county
- Dubgoba, Saku Sub-county
- Gargarsa, Saku Sub-county
- Makutano, Moyale Sub-county
- Sololo, Moyale Sub-county

Turkana County

Customary and new leaders:
- Lodwar, Central Division, Turkana Central Sub-county
- Nadapal, Nadapal Sub-location, Nadapal Location, Loima Sub-county
- Napeikar, Napeikar Sub-location, Nadapal Location, Loima Sub-county

Survey:
- Kanamkemer Sub-location, Kanamkemer Location, Central Division, Turkana Central Sub-county
- Najasikiria, Kanamkemer Sub-location, Kanamkemer Location, Central Division, Turkana Central Sub-county
- Narusebo, Nadapal Sub-location, Nadapal Location, Loima Sub-county
- Nasiger, Nasiger sub-location, Napeililim location, Loima Sub-county

West Pokot County

Customary leaders:
- Chebengi, Kacheliba Division, West Pokot Sub-county
- Kamorow, Kapenguria Division, West Pokot Sub-county
- Nasokol, Kapenguria Division, West Pokot Sub-county
- Psigirio, Kapenguria Division, West Pokot Sub-county
- Tartar, Kapenguria Division, West Pokot Sub-county

New leaders:
- Kapenguria, Kapenguria Division, West Pokot Sub-county

Survey:
- Chemarmar, Chepareria Division, Central Pokot Sub-county
- Kacheliba, Kacheliba Division, West Pokot Sub-county
- Kapenguria, Kapenguria Division, West Pokot Sub-county
- Totum, Kapenguria Division, West Pokot Sub-county

**Ethiopia**

**Borena Zone**

Customary leaders:
- Abun Kebele
- Dikale Kebele

New leaders:
- Yaaballoo

Survey:
- Abun Kebele
- Haro Baka Kebele
- Tarito Kebele
- Yaaballoo 1 Kebele

**Nyangatom**

Customary leaders:
- Kangaten
- Lopokor Kebele
- Lorenkachow Kebele
- Narogoi Kebele

New leaders:
- Kangaten

Survey:
- Kangaten
- Lopokor Kebele
- Lorenkachow Kebele

**Uganda**

**Amudat District**

Customary leaders:
- Lokodi, Amudat Sub-county
- Nabokotom, Amudat Sub-county
• Natirira, Amudat Sub-county
• Pamba, Amudat Sub-county

New leaders:
• Amudat, Amudat Town Council
• Naremit, Amudat Sub-county

Survey:
• Akorkeya, Abiliyep Parish, Loroo Sub-county
• Kalas, Amudat Town Council
• Loroo, Loroo Sub-county
• Naremit, Amudat Sub-county

Moroto District

Customary leaders:
• Campswahili, Moroto South Division, Moroto Municipality
• Kakoliye, Moroto South Division, Moroto Municipality
• Lokirimo, Moroto North Division, Moroto Municipality
• Junior Quarters, Moroto North Division, Moroto Municipality
• Lokotere, Rupa Parish, Rupa Sub-county
• Lorukumo, Rupa Parish, Rupa Sub-county
• Nakapelimen, Moroto South Division, Moroto Municipality
• Rupa, Rupa Parish, Rupa Sub-county

New leaders:
• Moroto, Moroto Municipality
• Rupa, Rupa Parish, Rupa Sub-county

Survey:
• Pupu, Pupu Parish, Rupa Sub-county
• Namagorat, Mogoth Parish, Rupa Sub-county
• North Division, Moroto Municipality
• Rupa, Rupa Parish, Rupa Sub-county

Appendix 2. Conjoint experiment instrument (with accompanying observational questions)

1. State incorporation or independence

1.1. Survey

1.1.1. Observational

Consider the following scenario. The future role of leaders of pastoralist communities may take two forms in Ethiopia / Kenya / Uganda. Which of the two options would you prefer?

Option 1 [State incorporation]
The government increases its influence in the dryland areas.

Option 2 [Independence]
The government does not interfere in dryland areas. Pastoralist ethnic groups are free to choose their systems of governance and govern themselves.
1.1.2. Experimental

Consider the following scenario. The future role of leaders of pastoralist communities may take two forms in Ethiopia / Kenya / Uganda. Which of the two options would you prefer?

Option 1 [State incorporation]
The government increases its influence in the dryland areas. Imagine that this option would have the following consequences:

- economic cost of pursuing this option is low / high;
- the security of your community is not likely to be affected / is likely to be negatively affected;
- your personal safety is not likely to be affected / is likely to be negatively affected;
- your personal income and wealth are not affected.

Option 2 [Independence]
The government does not interfere in dryland areas. Pastoralist ethnic groups are free to choose their systems of governance and govern themselves.

1.2. Customary leaders

1.2.1. Observational

Consider the following scenario. The future role of leaders of pastoralist communities such as yourself may take two forms in Ethiopia / Kenya / Uganda. Which of the two options would you prefer?

Option 1 [State incorporation]
The government increases its influence in the dryland areas.

Option 2 [Independence]
The government does not interfere in dryland areas. Pastoralist ethnic groups are free to choose their systems of governance and govern themselves.

1.2.2. Experimental

Consider the following scenario. The future role of leaders of pastoralist communities such as yourself may take two forms in Ethiopia / Kenya / Uganda. Which of the two options would you prefer?

Option 1 [State incorporation]
The government increases its influence in the dryland areas. Imagine that this option would have the following consequences:

- economic cost of pursuing this option/policy (which will be borne mostly by the people in your administrative division, including members of your ethnic community) is low / high;
- the influence of leaders such as yourself within your ethnic community is not affected / is likely to be negatively affected;
- your current political position and influence are not affected / are likely to be negatively affected;
- your personal income and wealth are not affected / are likely to be negatively affected.

Option 2 [Independence]
The government does not interfere in dryland areas. Pastoralist ethnic groups are free to choose their systems of governance and govern themselves. Imagine that this option would have the following consequences:
• economic cost of pursuing this option/policy (which will be borne mostly by the people in your administrative division, including members of your ethnic community) is low / high;
• the influence of leaders such as yourself within your ethnic community is not affected / is likely to be negatively affected;
• your current political position and influence are not affected / are likely to be negatively affected;
• your personal income and wealth are not affected / are likely to be negatively affected.

1.3. New leaders

1.3.1. Observational

Consider the following scenario. The future role of leaders of pastoralist communities such as yourself may take two forms in Ethiopia / Kenya / Uganda. Which of the two options would you prefer?

Option 1 [State incorporation]
The government increases its influence in the dryland areas.

Option 2 [Independence]
The government does not interfere in dryland areas. Pastoralist ethnic groups are free to choose their systems of governance and govern themselves.

1.3.2. Experimental

Consider the following scenario. The future role of leaders of pastoralist communities such as yourself may take two forms in Ethiopia / Kenya / Uganda. Which of the two options would you prefer?

Option 1 [State incorporation]
The government increases its influence in the dryland areas. Imagine that this option would have the following consequences:
• economic cost of pursuing this option/policy (which will be borne mostly by the people in your administrative division, including members of your ethnic community) is low / high;
• the influence of leaders such as yourself within your ethnic community is not affected / is likely to be negatively affected;
• your current political position and influence are not affected / are likely to be negatively affected;
• your personal income and wealth are not affected / are likely to be negatively affected.

Option 2 [Independence]
The government does not interfere in dryland areas. Pastoralist ethnic groups are free to choose their systems of governance and govern themselves. Imagine that this option would have the following consequences:
• economic cost of pursuing this option/policy (which will be borne mostly by the people in your administrative division, including members of your ethnic community) is low / high;
• the influence of leaders such as yourself within your ethnic community is not affected / is likely to be negatively affected;
• your current political position and influence are not affected / are likely to be negatively affected;
• your personal income and wealth are not affected / are likely to be negatively affected.

2. Elite incorporation or imposition

2.1. Survey

2.1.1. Observational
Consider the following scenario. The government of Ethiopia / Kenya / Uganda can implement one of the two following policies toward leaders of pastoralist communities, including in your area / county / district / woreda. Which of the policies would you prefer?

Policy 1
Pastoralist leaders are included in the government and government institutions because of their importance within their communities and directly participate in decisions about the dryland areas, including in your area / county / district / woreda.

Policy 2
The government introduces government institutions, including elected representative assemblies and other, elected positions, in the dryland areas, including in your area / county / district / woreda. Leaders of pastoralist communities can participate in elections, but no additional concessions are made to them.

2.1.2. Experimental

Consider the following scenario. The government of Ethiopia / Kenya / Uganda can implement one of the two following policies toward leaders of pastoralist communities, including in your area / county / district / woreda. Which of the policies would you prefer?

Policy 1
Pastoralist leaders are included in the government and government institutions because of their importance within their communities and directly participate in decisions about the dryland areas, including in your area / county / district / woreda. Imagine that this policy would have the following consequences:

- economic cost of pursuing this option is low / high;
- the security of your community is not likely to be affected / is likely to be negatively affected;
- your personal safety is not likely to be affected / is likely to be negatively affected;
- your personal income and wealth are not affected.

Policy 2
The government introduces government institutions, including elected representative assemblies and other, elected positions, in the dryland areas, including in your area / county / district / woreda. Leaders of pastoralist communities can participate in elections, but no additional concessions are made to them. Imagine that this policy would have the following consequences:

- economic cost of pursuing this option is low / high;
- the security of your community is not likely to be affected / is likely to be negatively affected;
- your personal safety is not likely to be affected / is likely to be negatively affected;
- your personal income and wealth are not affected.

2.2. Customary leaders

2.2.1. Observational

Consider the following scenario. The government of Ethiopia / Kenya / Uganda can implement one of the two following policies toward leaders of pastoralist communities, including in your area / county / district / woreda. Which of the policies would you prefer?

Policy 1
Pastoralist leaders—including elders / traditional leaders—are included in the government and government institutions because of their importance within their communities and directly participate in decisions about the dryland areas, including in your area / county / district / woreda.

Policy 2
The government introduces government institutions, including elected representative assemblies and other, elected positions, in the dryland areas, including in your area / county / district / woreda. Leaders of pastoralist communities can participate in elections, but no additional concessions are made to you.

2.2.2. Experimental

Consider the following scenario. The government of Ethiopia / Kenya / Uganda can implement one of the two following policies toward leaders of pastoralist communities, including in your area / county / district / woreda. Which of the policies would you prefer?

Policy 1
Pastoralist leaders—including elders / traditional leaders—are included in the government and government institutions because of their importance within their communities and directly participate in decisions about the dryland areas, including in your area / county / district / woreda. Imagine that this policy would have the following consequences:

- economic cost of pursuing this option/policy (which will be borne mostly by the people in your administrative division, including members of your ethnic community) is low / high;
- the influence of leaders such as yourself within your ethnic community is not affected / is likely to be negatively affected;
- your current political position and influence are not affected / are likely to be negatively affected;
- your personal income and wealth are not affected / are likely to be negatively affected.

Policy 2
The government introduces government institutions, including elected representative assemblies and other, elected positions, in the dryland areas, including in your area / county / district / woreda. Leaders of pastoralist communities can participate in elections, but no additional concessions are made to you. Imagine that this policy would have the following consequences:

- economic cost of pursuing this option/policy (which will be borne mostly by the people in your administrative division, including members of your ethnic community) is low / high;
- the influence of leaders such as yourself within your ethnic community is not affected / is likely to be negatively affected;
- your current political position and influence are not affected / are likely to be negatively affected;
- your personal income and wealth are not affected / are likely to be negatively affected.

2.3. New leaders

2.3.1. Observational

Consider the following scenario. The government of Ethiopia / Kenya / Uganda can implement one of the two following policies toward leaders of pastoralist communities, including in your area / county / district / woreda. Which of the policies would you prefer?

Policy 1
Pastoralist leaders—including elders / traditional leaders and leaders such as yourself—are included in the government and government institutions because of their importance within their communities and directly participate in decisions about the dryland areas, including in your area / county / district / woreda.

Policy 2
The government introduces government institutions, including elected representative assemblies and other, elected positions, in the dryland areas, including in your area / county / district / woreda. Leaders of pastoralist communities can participate in elections, but no additional concessions are made to you.

2.3.2. Experimental
Consider the following scenario. The government of Ethiopia / Kenya / Uganda can implement one of the two following policies toward leaders of pastoralist communities, including in your area / county / district / woreda. Which of the policies would you prefer?

Policy 1
Pastoralist leaders—including elders / traditional leaders and leaders such as yourself—are included in the government and government institutions because of their importance within their communities and directly participate in decisions about the dryland areas, including in your area / county / district / woreda. Imagine that this policy would have the following consequences:
- economic cost of pursuing this option/policy (which will be borne mostly by the people in your administrative division, including members of your ethnic community) is low / high;
- the influence of leaders such as yourself within your ethnic community is not affected / is likely to be negatively affected;
- your current political position and influence are not affected / are likely to be negatively affected;
- your personal income and wealth are not affected / are likely to be negatively affected.

Policy 2
The government introduces government institutions, including elected representative assemblies and other, elected positions, in the dryland areas, including in your area / county / district / woreda. Leaders of pastoralist communities can participate in elections, but no additional concessions are made to you. Imagine that this policy would have the following consequences:
- economic cost of pursuing this option/policy (which will be borne mostly by the people in your administrative division, including members of your ethnic community) is low / high;
- the influence of leaders such as yourself within your ethnic community is not affected / is likely to be negatively affected;
- your current political position and influence are not affected / are likely to be negatively affected;
- your personal income and wealth are not affected / are likely to be negatively affected.

3. Customary or new local leader (experimental only)

3.1. Survey

If you had to choose one of the following two leaders, which of them would you prefer to be responsible for allocation of money intended for a development project to benefit your community.

Elder / traditional leader of your ethnic community. This person:
- has weak / strong ties to the government;
- has weak / strong ties to the local pastoralist community;
- is poor / wealthy;
- has not attained a high level of formal education (for example never went to school or only attended primary school) / has attained a high level of formal education (for example university degree).

Local politician or another influential person who is a member of your ethnic community and is not an elder / traditional leader. This person:
- has weak / strong ties to the government;
- has weak / strong ties to the local pastoralist community;
- is poor / wealthy;
- has not attained a high level of formal education (for example never went to school or only attended primary school) / has attained a high level of formal education (for example university degree).

3.2. Customary leaders
Consider the following scenario. You have to work with one of the following two people to decide on and implement an important development initiative in the dryland areas. If you had to choose only one of them, with whom would you prefer to work to ensure the success of the initiative?

Elder / traditional leader of your ethnic community. This person:
- has weak / strong ties to the government;
- has weak / strong ties to the local pastoralist community;
- is poor / wealthy;
- has not attained a high level of formal education (for example never went to school or only attended primary school) / has attained a high level of formal education (for example university degree).

Local politician or another influential person who is a member of your ethnic community and is not an elder / traditional leader. This person:
- has weak / strong ties to the government;
- has weak / strong ties to the local pastoralist community;
- is poor / wealthy;
- has not attained a high level of formal education (for example never went to school or only attended primary school) / has attained a high level of formal education (for example university degree).

3.3. New leaders

Consider the following scenario. You have to work with one of the following two people to decide on and implement an important development initiative in the dryland areas. If you had to choose only one of them, with whom would you prefer to work to ensure the success of the initiative?

Elder / traditional leader of your ethnic community. This person:
- has weak / strong ties to the government;
- has weak / strong ties to the local pastoralist community;
- is poor / wealthy;
- has not attained a high level of formal education (for example never went to school or only attended primary school) / has attained a high level of formal education (for example university degree).

Local politician or another influential person who is a member of your ethnic community and is not an elder / traditional leader. This person:
- has weak / strong ties to the government;
- has weak / strong ties to the local pastoralist community;
- is poor / wealthy;
- has not attained a high level of formal education (for example never went to school or only attended primary school) / has attained a high level of formal education (for example university degree).

4. Opposition (or containment of opposition) or negotiations

4.1. Survey

4.1.1. Observational

If (out of the two policies presented in the preceding question) a policy with which you are dissatisfied is adopted by the government, pastoralist communities can respond in the following two ways. Which of these two responses would you prefer?

Response 1
Opposition to the government’s policy.
Response 2
Negotiations with the government which would satisfy at least some of its demands.

4.1.2. Experimental

If (out of the two policies presented in the preceding question) a policy with which you are dissatisfied is adopted by the government, pastoralist communities can respond in the following two ways. Which of these two responses would you prefer?

Response 1
Opposition to the government’s policy. This opposition could include both coercive and non-coercive means. Imagine that this option would have a low / high likelihood of success.

Response 2
Negotiations with the government which would satisfy at least some of its demands. Imagine that this option would have a low / high likelihood of success.

4.2. Customary leaders

4.2.1. Observational

If (out of the two policies presented in the preceding question) a policy with which you are dissatisfied is adopted by the government, pastoralist communities can respond in the following two ways. Which of these two responses would you prefer?

Response 1
Opposition to the government’s policy.

Response 2
Negotiations with the government which would satisfy at least some of its demands.

4.2.2. Experimental

If (out of the two policies presented in the preceding question) a policy with which you are dissatisfied is adopted by the government, pastoralist communities can respond in the following two ways. Which of these two responses would you prefer?

Response 1
Opposition to the government’s policy. This opposition could include both coercive and non-coercive means. Imagine that this option would have a low / high likelihood of success.

Response 2
Negotiations with the government which would satisfy at least some of its demands. Imagine that this option would have a low / high likelihood of success.

4.3. New leaders

4.3.1. Observational

If (out of the two policies presented in the preceding question) a policy with which you are dissatisfied is adopted by the government, pastoralist communities can respond in the following two ways. Which of these two responses would you prefer?

Response 1
Opposition to the government’s policy.

Response 2
Negotiations with the government which would satisfy at least some of its demands.

4.3.2. Experimental

If (out of the two policies presented in the preceding question) a policy with which you are dissatisfied is adopted by the government, pastoralist communities can respond in the following two ways. Which of these two responses would you prefer?

Response 1
Opposition to the government’s policy. This opposition could include both coercive and non-coercive means. Imagine that this option would have a low / high likelihood of success.

Response 2
Negotiations with the government which would satisfy at least some of its demands. Imagine that this option would have a low / high likelihood of success.

Appendix 3. Experiment responses

Table. Political agent conjoint experiment responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Customary leaders: 802</th>
<th>New leaders: 888</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia: 265</td>
<td>Ethiopia: 265</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Borena (Borana): 99</td>
<td>• Borena (Borana): 158</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Nyangatom: 166</td>
<td>• Nyangatom: 107</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya: 274</td>
<td>Kenya: 332</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Marsabit (Borana): 77</td>
<td>• Marsabit (Borana): 113</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Turkana: 91</td>
<td>• Turkana: 63</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• West Pokot: 104</td>
<td>• West Pokot: 156</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uganda: 265</td>
<td>Uganda: 291</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Amudat (Pokot): 183</td>
<td>• Amudat (Pokot): 152</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Moroto (Karimojong): 82</td>
<td>• Moroto (Karimojong): 122</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

| Atiker: 338            | Atiker: 330      |
|  • Karamojong: 87      |  • Karamojong: 159 |
|  • Nyangatom: 160      |  • Nyangatom: 107 |
|  • Turkana: 91         |  • Turkana: 64   |
| Borana: 176            | Borana: 167      |
| Pokot: 287             | Pokot: 281       |
| Other: 112 (including Burji: 23; Gabbra: 38; Rendille: 26; Samburu: 5—all in Marsabit) |

Table. Regular inhabitants of the drylands (survey) responses

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Countries and areas</th>
<th>Ethnic groups</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Ethiopia: 304</td>
<td>Atiker: 531</td>
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<tr>
<td>• Borena (Borana): 206</td>
<td>• Karamojong: 188</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Nyangatom: 98</td>
<td>• Nyangatom: 93</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Kenya: 490</td>
<td>• Turkana: 250</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>• Marsabit (Borana): 119</td>
<td>• Borana: 310</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

40
Appendix 4. Regression results for the benchmark regression used to compute the AMCEs

Significance codes: 
- ‘***’–0.001, ‘**’–0.01, ‘*’–0.05
- Coef. = regression coefficients
- SE = standard errors clustered by respondent

State incorporation or independence

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Coef</th>
<th>SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Incorporation - personal safety</td>
<td>0.0534791</td>
<td>0.027809</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Incorporation - personal wealth</td>
<td>0.0197537</td>
<td>0.027742</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Incorporation - local security situation</td>
<td>0.0123170</td>
<td>0.027824</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>D. Incorporation - communal economic cost</td>
<td>0.0257001</td>
<td>0.027858</td>
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<td>E. Independence - personal safety</td>
<td>0.0069289</td>
<td>0.027816</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>F. Independence - personal wealth</td>
<td>-0.0185874</td>
<td>-0.028038</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>G. Independence - local security situation</td>
<td>-0.0117823</td>
<td>-0.027777</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>H. Independence - communal economic cost</td>
<td>0.0225565</td>
<td>0.027966</td>
</tr>
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</table>

Customary leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
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<th>SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Incorporation - personal safety</td>
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<td>0.034643</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Incorporation - personal wealth</td>
<td>0.0246579</td>
<td>0.033844</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Incorporation - cust. leaders' influence</td>
<td>0.0210710</td>
<td>0.033582</td>
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<tr>
<td>D. Incorporation - communal economic cost</td>
<td>-0.0861957*</td>
<td>0.034591</td>
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<tr>
<td>E. Independence - personal safety</td>
<td>-0.0505173</td>
<td>0.033558</td>
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<tr>
<td>F. Independence - personal wealth</td>
<td>-0.0326527</td>
<td>0.033984</td>
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<td>G. Independence - cust. leaders' influence</td>
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<td>0.036762</td>
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<td>0.035394</td>
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New leaders

<table>
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<tr>
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<th>SE</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Incorporation - personal safety</td>
<td>-0.0069952</td>
<td>0.032954</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>B. Incorporation - personal wealth</td>
<td>0.0550495</td>
<td>0.032958</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>C. Incorporation – new leaders' influence</td>
<td>0.0369649</td>
<td>0.031084</td>
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<tr>
<td>D. Incorporation - communal economic cost</td>
<td>0.0261497</td>
<td>0.032453</td>
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<tr>
<td>E. Independence - personal safety</td>
<td>-0.0708477*</td>
<td>0.033242</td>
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<td>F. Independence - personal wealth</td>
<td>-0.0342475</td>
<td>0.034445</td>
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<tr>
<td>G. Independence - new leaders' influence</td>
<td>-0.0815398**</td>
<td>0.031102</td>
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<tr>
<td>H. Independence - communal economic cost</td>
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<td>0.031102</td>
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Elite incorporation or imposition

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<tr>
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<td>0.027991</td>
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<td>B. Incorporation - personal wealth</td>
<td>-0.0288251</td>
<td>0.027987</td>
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C. Incorporation - local security situation  0.0033076  0.027930
D. Incorporation - communal economic cost  0.0081922  0.027874
E. Independence - personal safety  -0.0077531  0.028004
F. Independence - personal wealth  -0.0130022  0.027923
G. Independence - local security situation  -0.0357944  0.027867
H. Independence - communal economic cost  0.0183899  0.028045

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
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<tr>
<td>A. Incorporation - personal safety</td>
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<td>C. Incorporation - cust. leaders' influence</td>
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<td>D. Incorporation - communal economic cost</td>
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New leaders

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<td>B. Incorporation - personal wealth</td>
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<td>G. Independence - new leaders' influence</td>
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<td>H. Independence - communal economic cost</td>
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Customary leaders

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Component</th>
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<tr>
<td>A. Customary leader's government ties</td>
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<td>B. Customary leader's local ties</td>
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<td>C. Customary leader's education</td>
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<td>G. New leader's education</td>
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<td>H. New leader's wealth</td>
<td>0.0066864</td>
<td>0.029353</td>
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Regular drylanders

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Component</th>
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<th>SE</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Customary leader's government ties</td>
<td>0.013188</td>
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<tr>
<td>B. Customary leader's local ties</td>
<td>0.141902***</td>
<td>0.034840</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. Customary leader's education</td>
<td>0.094747**</td>
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<td>D. Customary leader's wealth</td>
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### New leaders

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<tr>
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### Opposition of negotiations

### Regular drylanders

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<tr>
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<td>B. Opposition - likelihood of sanctions</td>
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<tr>
<td>C. Negotiations - likelihood of success</td>
<td>0.0020589</td>
<td>0.028223</td>
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<tr>
<td>D. Negotiations - likelihood of sanctions</td>
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<td>0.028174</td>
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### Customary leaders

<table>
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<tr>
<th>Component</th>
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<td>B. Opposition - likelihood of sanctions</td>
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<td>C. Negotiations - likelihood of success</td>
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### New leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Component</th>
<th>Coef</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>A. Opposition - likelihood of success</td>
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<td>C. Negotiations - likelihood of success</td>
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<td>0.029914</td>
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<tr>
<td>D. Negotiations - likelihood of sanctions</td>
<td>-0.034097</td>
<td>0.030402</td>
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</table>
Appendix 5. Effects of randomly varied individual attributes and policy components / consequences by area

State incorporation or independence

Regular drylanders

Customary leaders
### New leaders

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>A</th>
<th>Inheritance</th>
<th>Family dominance</th>
<th>Influence</th>
<th>Regular drylanders</th>
<th>Low economic cost for the local population</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>B</td>
<td>Linguistic</td>
<td>Social integration</td>
<td>Wealth</td>
<td>-0.30 - 0.30</td>
<td>-0.25 - 0.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>C</td>
<td>Sociopolitical</td>
<td>Political integration</td>
<td>Power</td>
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<td>-0.25 - 0.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>D</td>
<td>Cultural</td>
<td>Social cohesion</td>
<td>Influence</td>
<td>-0.30 - 0.30</td>
<td>-0.25 - 0.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>E</td>
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<td>Wealth</td>
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<td>-0.25 - 0.25</td>
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<td>F</td>
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<td>Cultural integration</td>
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<td>G</td>
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<td>Political cohesion</td>
<td>Influence</td>
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<td>-0.25 - 0.25</td>
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<td>Social</td>
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<td>-0.25 - 0.25</td>
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<td>Power</td>
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<td>-0.25 - 0.25</td>
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<tr>
<td>J</td>
<td>Environmental</td>
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### Elite incorporation or imposition

#### Regular drylanders

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Customary or new local leaders

Regular drylanders

Customary leaders
New leaders

Opposition or negotiations

Regular drylanders
Customary leaders

New leaders

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References


Howe, Kimberly, Elizabeth Stites, and Darlington Akabwai. 2015. “‘We Now Have Relative Peace’; Changing Conflict Dynamics in Northern Karamoja, Uganda.” Somerville, Massachusetts: Feinstein International Center, Tufts University.


